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Introduction
The decisions taken by the Portuguese National Competition Authority (NCA) 
in “merger control procedure”1 may be contested before the Competition, Regulation 
and Supervision Court (CRSC), as stipulated in Article 92 (1) of  the Portuguese 
Competition Law (PCL).2
The fact that the first-line decision-maker is an administrative authority raises 
questions about potential problematic issues with the type of  judicial control exercised. 
3The problem is the existence and/or degree of  judicial deference to the administrative 
decision, considering fundamental and conflicting values, such as the principle of  
Separation and interdependence of  powers, on the one hand, and the right to effective 
judicial protection, on the other, all being normative commands of  the founding idea 
of  the rule of  law.
This is the legal problem that we will develop in this text, which will be 
circumscribed, by its importance, to four typical NCA decisions taken under that 
procedure, namely: the formal decision that the merger is not covered by the merger 
control procedure [see Article 50 (1) (a) of  the PCL]; and decisions on the merits, 
specifically  the prohibition decision [see Article 53 (1) (b) of  the PCL], the simple 
non-opposition decision [see Article 50 (1) (b) and 53 (1) (a), both of  the PCL] and 
non-opposition decision accompanied by the imposition of  conditions or obligations 
aimed at ensuring compliance with undertakings given by the notifier [see Article 50(2) 
and 53 (3), both of  the PCL].
At the end, it may be noted that, although this is a problem whose response must 
at least be reconciled with domestic law, there is, with some exceptions, a significant 
convergence between the solutions reached at this level and the solutions which are 
assumed by European Union law. That is because as regards merger control, and 
contrary to what is done in the field of  sanctions, the matrix of  the two legal systems 
is the same. Both are in the “province of  Administrative law”.4
I. Applicable rules
In European Law, although Articles 101 and 102 of  the TFEU, which once served 
to regulate this matter, remain in full force, the merger control is, currently, regulated 
by the Regulation (EC) N. º 139/2004 of  20 January 2004 and the Regulation (EC) 
N. º 802/2004 of  the Commission of  7 April 2004, which are applicable to mergers 
classified as having a ‘Community dimension’.5 This means that European Competition 
law is not directly applicable to the control procedures of  mergers of  undertakings 
within the jurisdiction of  the NCA, which are subject to the PCL.6
To fill this gap, Nicolas Petit and Rabeux Louise7 suggest the principle of  
1 See section of  Section II, Chapter III, of  the PCL.  
2 Law nº. 19/2012, of  08.05. 
3 See Jan S. Oster, “The Scope of  Judicial Review in the German and U.S. Administrative Legal 
System”, German Law Journal, vol. 9, n.º 10 (2008): 1267. 
4 Pedro Costa Gonçalves, Controlo de Concentrações no Direito Português (uma Visão Jus-
Administrativa)”, Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, Ano II, n.º 7/8 (2011): 246. 
5 See Article 1 (1) of  Regulation No 139/2004. 
6 Cf. in this sense, Margarida Rosário da Fonseca and Luís do Nascimento Ferreira, O Procedimento de 
Controlo das Operações de Concentração de Empresas em Portugal (Coimbra: Almedina, 2009), 192. Although 
the authors’ claims are based on the previous Law on Competition, they remain current. 
7 Nicolas Petit and Rabeux Louise, “Judicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic 
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procedural autonomy should serve that function. So the solution must be found in the 
domestic legal order.8
However, this is not a unanimous position. There are some authors that propose 
a solution within the parameters defined by European Competition law. This is the 
case of  Margarida Rosário da Fonseca and Luís do Nascimento Ferreira, based on 
the idea of  approximation and with support, among other things, on the following 
grounds: in the general principle of  interpretation in accordance with European Union 
law and; the principle of  effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 268(4) of  the 
Portuguese Constitution.9 These authors propose parameters inspired by European 
case-law, specifically the decision of  the Court of  First Instance (CFI) in the Tetra Laval 
II case,10 and the decisions of  the CFI and, on appeal, of  the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union (CJEU) in Impala/SonyBMG.1112
Notwithstanding the fact that the jurisprudence of  the European Union Courts is 
relevant as a criterion for interpretation, we do not fully subscribe to the aforementioned 
statement as it begins, develops, and ends in the case-law of  the European Union.
Not only is that case-law not entirely law-creating, since it forms part of  a legal 
framework constituted by the rules on judicial control embodied in the TFEU which 
apply only to the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU), EU law on merger 
control is not, as previously stated, directly applicable. Consequently, the answer must 
start and be reconciled with the national regulatory parameters, that is to say, it is, at 
least in the first place, a domestic law problem.
Saying that, judicial control must respect Articles 3(1), 71(2) and 91(5) of  the 
Code of  Procedure in the Administrative Courts (CPAC), which are applied through 
Articles 91 and 92 (1), both of  the PCL. 
II. Discretionary and binding – criterion of  distinction
According to rules mentioned above, judicial control, related to the discretionary 
activity of  the administration is more limited. 
By virtue of  the evolution of  the principle of  legality, it is now certain that 
administrative activity is never entirely discretionary, since it is bound by, at least, 
competence and purpose. Consequently, what matters, for the purposes of  applying 
the CPAC rules referred to earlier, is not to identify discretionary acts and/or linked acts 
but discretionary and/or linked decision-making segments. However, what precisely 
these segments of  discretion consist of  is quite controversial.
Regulation”, in Judicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation: A Post Commission v. 
Tetra Laval Assessment” (Gronigen: Europe Law Publishing, 2009): 117, available online at http://orbi.
ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/41214/1/National%20courts%20and%20the%20standard%20of%20
review%20in%20competition%20law%20and%20economic% 20regulation.pdf. 
8 In accordance with that principle, in the absence of  Union rules on the subject, it is for the domestic 
legal system of  each Member State to lay down those rules, provided, however, that they are no less 
favorable than those governing similar situations governed by domestic law (principle of  equivalence) 
and which make it practically or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Union law 
(principle of  effectiveness) - cf. to that effect VEBIC, C-439/08, EU: C: 2010: 739, paragraph 63 and 
Nike European Operations Netherlands, C-310/14, EU: C: 2015: 690, paragraph 28 and case-law 
referred to therein). 
9 Margarida Rosário da Fonseca and Luís do Nascimento Ferreira, O Procedimento…, 191-193. 
10 Judgement Tetra Laval II , Case C-12/03 P. 
11 Judgements Impala / SonyBMG , Cases T-464/04 and C-413/06 P. 
12 See Margarida Rosário da Fonseca and Luís do Nascimento Ferreira, O Procedimento…, 193-198. 
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The divergences develop mainly around two main axes (i) on the one hand, the 
distinction between volitional discretion and cognitive discretion; (ii) and, on the other hand, 
the choice between a conceptual or methodological criterion and a dogmatic criterion. They are not 
two watertight axes, but they intersect, as will be explained.
The first, which corresponds essentially to the classical approach, is based on 
the formal differentiation between the determination and the prediction of  the norm. 
The discretion in the determination of  the norm corresponds, in German doctrine, 
to the discretion itself  (or discretionary in determining or volitional) and the discretion in 
the prediction of  the norm corresponds to a margin of  appreciation (or discretion in the 
hypothesis or cognitive).13
In general terms, discretion in the statute focuses on the legal consequences of  
the rule, and can take two forms: the discretion of  action; and the discretion of  choice. The 
former is the option of  acting or not acting and is often affirmed; “through the permissive 
deontic concept (‘may’)”.14 The latter presupposes, in turn, the choice between two or more 
actions allowed by the norm, whether they are provided as alternatives, or the standard 
is limited to defining an objective and to indicate a core of  decision criteria.15
According to Vieira de Andrade, the doctrine never had doubts as to the existence 
of  discretion in these cases. The divergences arise mainly in discretion in the hypothesis 
or cognitive, that is to say, when the law uses indeterminate concepts in the normative 
prediction.16
Thus, at one extreme, there are positions that exclude the indeterminate concepts 
of  discretionary activity, since they constitute a logical-subsonic activity of  application 
of  the law and, to that extent, are strictly linked.17 This is the case in German case-law, 
whose rule is to admit administrative discretion only when it is expressly recognized by 
law, by using terms such as “may” or “similar”, and that makes the distinction between 
prediction (Tatbestand), subsumption (Subsumtion) and determination (Rechtsfolge) to limit 
discretion to this third element, thus corresponding to the recognition of  volitional 
discretion.18 Although exceptions are allowed, such as “procedural impracticability to carry 
out, in the course of  judicial proceedings, a contentious examination of  the sub-judicial judgment by the 
administrative authority”,19 it is submitted that the courts in Germany exercise a high level 
of  judicial control which, according to Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer and Katryn 
Wright, is particularly true in merger cases.20
13 See António Cadilha, “Os poderes de pronúncia jurisdicionais na acção de condenação à prática 
de acto Devido e os limites funcionais da justiça administrativa”, Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor 
Sérvulo Correia, vol. II, Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 
2010):. 174. See also Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, “A discricionariedade administrativa: reflexões a partir 
da pluridimensionalidade da função administrativa”, O Direito, 144, III, (2012), 614 and Jan S. Oster, The 
Scope…, 1268-1271. 
14 José Carlos Vieira de Andrade, “ Os poderes de cognição e de decisão do juiz no quadro do actual 
processo administrativo de plena jurisdição”, Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa, n.º 101 (2013), 55. 
15 See António Cadilha, Os poderes…,175; Jan S. Oster, The Scope…, 1270. 
16 See António Cadilha, Os poderes…, 175-176; Jan S. Oster, The Scope…, 1269. 
17 See António Cadilha, Os poderes…,185-186, supra note 44. 
18 See António Cadilha, Os poderes…, 182-185; Jan S. Oster, The Scope…, 1269; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, 
“Discretion in German Administrative Law: Doctrinal Discourse Revisited”, European Public Law, vol. 
6, 1 (2000): 70 and 73-75. 
19 See António Cadilha, Os Poderes…, 184. According to the same author, one of  the exceptions allowed 
by German case-law is whether the decision involves prospective judgments or risk assessment, in 
particular in the context of  administrative economic law or the environment. 
20 Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer and Katryn Wright, “Judicial scrutiny of  merger decisions in the 
EU, UK and Germany”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly”, vol. 60, (2011): 94. Yutaka Arai-
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Moreover, , there are understandings that postulate the existence of  a margin 
of  appreciation in relation to indeterminate concepts, although not in completely 
convergent terms, being mainly in this area that the distinction between the conceptual 
or methodological criterion and the dogmatic criterion appeared.
Thus, certain theses - those adopting a conceptual or methodological criterion - are based 
on the “meaningful-conceptual content” of  norms, as if  discretion were based on the “nature 
of  things”.21 Starting from this approach, there are, as described by Castanheira Neves, 
two broad guidelines: one that admits the possibility of  a discretionary decision in 
relation to all indeterminate concepts; and the one that accepts it only in relation to the 
so-called concepts of  value.22 
Next to the more restrictive theses, we can situate the concept of  technical 
discretion developed by Italian doctrine.23 It is also a cognitive discretion and includes 
only; “cases in which administrative activity is developed according to technical criteria and not in the 
light of  any indeterminate concepts or on the basis of  criteria of  common experience”24 and, within 
technical judgments, does not cover the so-called judgments of  existence, but only the 
judgments of  probability, that is, the judgments “on the orientation of  a particular causal 
nexus involving a prognosis”,25  which have a “markedly opinionated and evaluative character”.26
For the dogmatic criterion, what matters is the existence of  a “deliberate legislative 
intention”,27 to be recognized by interpretation, which, implicitly or explicitly, attributes 
discretion to the Administration.
This criterion includes the so-called authorization theory supported by some 
German doctrine.28 Also included in this line is the Chevron doctrine adopted in the 
USA, which was created by a Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 15.06.1984. The original thesis adopted by the Supreme 
Court consists of  two steps (“Chevron step-one” and “Chevron step-two”) and a third one 
(“Chevron step-zero”) was added following doctrinal elaboration and Supreme Court 
decisions. The first step determines whether Congress has regulated the matter in a 
precise, clear or unambiguous way, i.e., whether the rule is not indeterminate. In this 
hypothesis, there is no judicial deference by the court. It is further argued that this 
judgment must be carried out in accordance with the traditional tools of  interpretation 
of  the law.29
It is important to note that the conceptual and dogmatic criteria can work together 
with the differentiation between cognitive discretion and volitional discretion, being 
criteria for measuring the margin of  decision in the field of  indeterminate concepts, 
as can be applied autonomously within a unitary theory of  administrative discretion.30
Takahashi advances with historical reasons to explain this intensity of  judicial oversight. 
21 Castanheira Neves, “O problema da discricionariedade”, Digesta, vol. 1 (Coimbra: s/e, 1995): 578. 
22 Castanheira Neves, O problema…, 580-581. 
23 Our administrative case-law has accepted this concept of  technical discretion - cf., for example, 
the Supreme Administrative Court judgment of  27.10.2016, case nº. 01071/11, and the Supreme 
Administrative Court judgment of  12.05.2016, proc. 0236/16. 
24 Miguel Nogueira de Brito, “Sobre a discricionariedade técnica”, Revista de Direito e de Estudos Sociais, 
36 (1994): 38-39.  
25 Miguel Nogueira de Brito, Sobre a discricionariedade…, 41. 
26 Miguel Nogueira de Brito, Sobre a discricionariedade…, 41. 
27 Castanheira Neves, O problema…, 577.  
28 See António Cadilha, Os poderes…, 178; Jan S. Oster, The Scope…, 1273-1275; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, 
Special…, 75. 
29 See Jan S. Oster, The Scope…, 1280-1284. 
30 See António Cadilha, Os poderes…,  181-182. 
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For this unitary theory, discretion encompasses both indetermination in terms 
of  legal consequences, and indeterminacy at the level of  prediction, through the use 
of  indeterminate concepts.31 It is argued that this distinction is artificial, only being 
practicable on a strictly logical-formal plane,32 since “there is a bond or discretion ... it will have 
one and the other to refer to the application of  the norm as a whole, in its unitary correlation between 
the hypothesis and statuition, without being able to say that one or the other is located exclusively in the 
application of  any of  these abstract (non-autonomous) elements of  the norm”.33
EU case-law also makes no distinction between prediction and statute, regardless 
of  discretion. As a safe criterion of  distinction, there is no more than an affirmation 
of  the existence of  a discretion in relation to complex economic assessments, which is 
reflected in the recognition that the Commission; “has a certain discretionary power, 
in particular as regards economic assessments and a margin of  discretion underlying 
the rules of  an economic nature which form part of  the Merger Regulation”- see inter 
alia the CJEU judgment in Case C-68/94 Kali and Salz, paragraph 223, judgment of  the 
CJEU in Tetra Laval (Case C-12/03 P), paragraphs 38 and 39 and judgment of  the CFI 
in Case Airtours (Case T-342/99), paragraph 64.
Among us, the CRSC has already appraised and decided some actions to challenge 
final decisions rendered by the NCA in merger cases. The most important is the 
judgment rendered in case nº. 3/13.5YQSTR, which recognized discretion even when 
indeterminate concepts are involved and also recognized that the substantive decision-
making power of  the NCA is included in its margin of  free decision because it involves 
prognosis judgments.
III. What is the best criterion?
In first place, we think that approaches that are based on conceptual or 
methodological criteria should be rejected, since, in the strict sense of  legal science, 
one can conclude with Castanheira Neves that the discretionary; “does not impose itself  as 
an autonomous methodological category within the general methodological framework of  the application 
of  law or ‘law enforcement’”.34
More importantly, however, such approaches are not considered to take into 
account the principles underlying the recognition of  administrative discretion, in 
particular, the principle of  Separation and interdependence of  Powers and the principle 
of  Legality. What results from these principles is that discretion is a creation of  the 
legislator. That is to say, in simplified terms, there is only discretion when the legislator 
wants and can, so that, in areas where the legislator can attribute discretion to the 
Administration, the determination of  this own space of  valuation has to go through 
the measurement of  his will, to be interpreted in terms similar to those that are part 
of  the theory of  normative habilitation and the “Chevron doctrine”. Therefore, legal science 
arises here through the application of  the criteria of  interpretation of  the law and not 
through conceptualizations around the structure of  standards.
In the end, it is possible to reach understandings that are totally or partially 
convergent with these approaches. However, the course is not the same, that is, it will 
not be based on aprioristic conceptions centered on the structure of  norms, closed 
31 Ana Raquel Moniz, A Discricionariedade…, 644-645. António Cadilha also maintains a broad 
concept of  discretion. 
32 Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 614. 
33 Castanheira Neves, O problema…, 586. 
34 Castanheira Neves, O problema…, 595. 
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in an abstractionism oblivious of  the fundamental principles underlying the problem. 
These elements, at most, may be relevant, as interpretative criteria, to conclude that this 
was the will of  the legislator.
In part for the same reasons, we also reject approaches that are based on a 
differentiation between prediction and statuition of  the norm, because, in general, they 
also rely on conceptual or methodological foundations, by referring undetermined 
concepts to a task of  logical-subscriptive application of  the law based on parameters 
related to the structure of  the standards.
Moreover, even when - as appears to be the case in German case law - they 
converge the differentiation between prediction, subsumption and statuation with an 
express intention of  the legislator in relation to the last element, translated into the 
use of  permissive terms such as “may”, they start from a conception of  discretion that 
equates it with a certain notion of  free choice between equivalent solutions. This idea is 
also found in the case law of  the Supreme Administrative Court, through the definition 
of  discretion as a “freedom of  choice between several solutions considered as equally possible [the 
Administration freely chooses one of  the solutions indicated in the law…”] good, any of  them].35
This conception is to reject. First, because discretion is not, according to Ana 
Raquel Moniz, an act of  will, but an “act of  judgment”,36 that is, it is not an act of  subjective 
will, which carries with it a certain idea of  arbitrariness, but a rational decision.37 Second, 
the essential nucleus of  the concept of  discretion is not the idea of  choosing between 
two or more possible and equivalent solutions, which may lead to the misconception of  
excluding the indeterminate concepts used in the prediction of  the law. The essential 
nucleus of  the concept lies in the pursuit of  the public interest in the concrete case, 
subordinated to the duty to adopt the best solution for that interest.38
The pursuit of  the public interest in the concrete case may depend not only on 
the legal consequences and the decision on whether, in light of  the best solution to the 
pursuit of  the public interest, it is necessary for the Administration to act or not to act 
or for the measure to be adopted from several possible solutions. The pursuit of  the 
public interest in the concrete case may also depend on the weights and evaluations 
that must be undertaken to assess the operating assumptions and the measures to 
be applied. Consequently, there are no a priori reasons to exclude from discretion the 
indeterminate concepts used by the legislator in defining the provision of  the standard.
Having clarified these points, it is considered that what matters is, through 
interpretation of  the law, to determine whether there is a “delegation made by the legislator 
to the agent to find the solution in the particular case”.39 Or, in other words, it is necessary to 
conclude that the matter makes part of  the essential nucleus of  the administrative 
activity, which is immune to interference from other powers, under penalty of  de-
characterising and emptying the functional specialization of  each one.40 This is, in essentially 
terms, the meaning of  the principle of  Separation and interdependence of  powers. 
What, it should be noted, it does not mean is an immense or completely open field 
of  possibilities, since this criterion has to be reconciled with the material grounds of  
administrative discretion, which are (i) the fact that the administration is better placed 
35 Decision of  03.03.2016, case n.º 0768/15.  
36 Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 604. 
37 Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 605. 
38 See Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 608-609. 
39 António Augusto Costa, “A erosão do princípio da legalidade e a discricionariedade administrativa”, 
Cedipre Online, 12 (2012): 9, available at  http://www.fd.uc.pt/cedipre/publicacoes/online/public_12.pdf.
40 António Cadilha, Os poderes, 165. 
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(in terms of  expertise) to pursue the public interest in the case and; (ii) the democratic 
legitimacy of  the Administration.
In this context, what should be noted is that the NCA is an independent 
administrative entity and where the exercise of  discretionary activity by independent 
administrative entities is concerned, which may be designated as regulatory discretion,41 the 
material ground for discretion cannot be found in a strong democratic legitimacy and 
political responsibility.
Consequently, the conciliation of  the dogmatic criterion with the material grounds 
of  discretion leads to the circumscription of  the said interpretative task to the decision-
making segments in relation to which it must be recognized that the administrative 
decision-maker is the best positioned entity to determine the best solution for the 
public interest to be realized. This means that regulatory discretion can be recognized 
only in the decision-making segments that involve: technical judgments; prognosis 
judgments; resource rationing judgments; or strategic decisions.42
On the other hand, in the case of  those segments and, essentially, for the same 
reasons, the interpretative effort must be taken in the negative, i.e., in the absence of  
reasons to the contrary, it must be concluded that the legislature wanted to assign to the 
administrative entity an own space valuation. And with this understanding, it is believed 
that the right to effective judicial protection is safeguarded, since the recognition of  
regulatory discretion is not arbitrary, but is based on the principle of  Separation of  
interdependence of  powers, associated with a material or substantive foundation.
It is important to note that these considerations do not differ essentially from 
those under European Competition law with regard to merger control.
Thus, in the first place, the starting point is also a legal rule, in particular, Article 
263 TFEU.
Secondly, to justify to the limited judicial control resulting from that provision is 
also institutional, as reflected in the principle of  Separation of  powers.43 In addition, 
there is a material basis, which is the Commission’s greater technical preparation vis-a-vis 
the courts.44
Thirdly, it is recognized that the subject has fundamental rights, such as the right 
to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 (1) of  the European Convention on Human Rights.45 
Finally, there is discretion when complex economic assessments are involved.46
IV. Binding and discretionary segments in the NCA’s decisions
Once the criterion has been identified, it should be applied to the decisions of  the 
NCA in the merger control procedure identified in the introduction.
Thus, in the first place, there is no discretion, but binding, concerning jurisdiction, 
which, according to Article 19 (1) (d) of  the respective Statutes, belong to the Board of  
Directors. This is a direct result of  the principle of  Legality.
41 See about this concept and characterization, Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 641-
644. 
42 Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 642. 
43 Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer and Katryn Wright, Judicial scrutiny of  merger…, 116; José Carlos 
Laguna de Paz, “Understanding the limits of  judicial review in European competition law”, Jornal of  
Antitrust Enforcement, vol. 2, n.º 1 (2014): 204. 
44 Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer and Katryn Wright, Judicial scrutiny of  merger…, 116. 
45 José Carlos Laguna de Paz, Understanding the limits…, 204. 
46 See José Carlos Laguna de Paz, Understanding the limits…, 215-218. 
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Secondly and on the same basis, there is no discretion but binding, as regards the 
typical protected public interest, which is the promotion and defense of  competition, in 
the specific terms set out in Article 41(1) of  the PCL, translated into the; need to preserve 
and develop, in the interests of  intermediate and final consumers, effective competition in the national 
market or in a substantial part thereof. This means, for example, that the NCA cannot 
authorize a concentration in accordance with the criterion set out in Article 41(1) of  its 
Statutes, that is to say “when the benefits accruing therefrom for the pursuit of  strategic interests of  
the national economy to overcome, in particular, the inherent disadvantages of  competition”. This is a 
decision reserved to the Council of  Ministers, in accordance with paragraph 3 of  the 
same legal standard, which is not technical but, political in nature.
Thirdly, it must be understood that there is no discretion, but binding, with 
regards to the conditions or formal requirements for a concentration to be subject 
to the control procedure [see Articles 36 to 39 of  the PCL], since the model adopted 
depends on the private initiative, which is mandatory, and is likely to generate the 
practice of  an offense provided for in Article 68(1)(f) of  the PCL. Due to this factor, 
we consider that there is a sufficiently strong reason to conclude that the legislature did 
not intend to attribute discretion to the NCA in relation to these segments.
In fact, although the merger control procedure has a distinct nature comparing 
to the sanctioning process, an unsustainable antinomy is generated, in light of  the 
criterion chosen for the definition of  the discretionary segments, if  we admit that the 
court is able to review, in totum, the decision of  the NCA in these matters and no longer 
in the context of  mergers. While it is true that most of  these requirements include 
legal parameters and concepts, for which there would be other reasons to support 
their binding nature, it also covers elements closer to economic science, such as the 
delimitation of  the relevant market, necessary for the calculation of  the quota market, 
and also in the fair competition analysis, where European Union case-law has affirmed 
the existence of  complex economic assessments.47
Therefore, revisiting the position that has been taken so far on the delimitation 
of  the relevant market, we conclude that the segments referred to above should not 
be considered to be included at the discretion of  the NCA. It should be noted that 
this understanding concerning the delimitation of  relevant markets and, specifically, 
its effects on the type of  judicial review is not innovative. In fact, Miguel Sousa Ferro 
maintains, although on different grounds, a normal judicial control.48
It is true that this results in a slight divergence from European Competition law, 
especially where these segments involve complex economic assessments. However, 
this is a consequence of  the different nature that assumes the sanctioning dimension 
of  Competition law, whose matrix is closer to criminal law and procedural criminal law 
and not to Administrative law, and is contrary to European Competition law.
For the same reasons and in general terms, that judgment applies to all cross - 
sections between the sanctioning procedure and the merger control procedure, as is 
the case, for example, of  the concept of  dominant position presupposed by Article 
41(4) of  the PCL, which is common to the abuse of  a dominant position (see Article 
11 of  the PCL). This, in particular, does not conflict with the case-law of  the European 
Union, since, as Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer and Katryn Wright point out, the 
47 See José Carlos Laguna da Paz, Understanding the limits…, 216 and note 102, indicating relevant case-
law, in particular Case T-342/99 Airtours, paragraph 26. 
48 Miguel Sousa Ferro, A definição dos mercados relevantes no direito europeu e português da concorrência: teoria e 
prática (Coimbra: Almedina, 2014), 613 and 670-672. 
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Court in Airtours defined precisely the criteria for applying the concept of  collective 
dominance, although it is based on principles of  game theory that require a high level 
of  expertise.49
Fourthly, with regard to decisions on merits (objection and non-opposition, or 
with commitments) and at the level of  statute, the discretion of  the Board is quite 
limited. Thus, according to the German doctrine and the position taken by Pedro 
Costa Gonçalves, it must be borne in mind that “when there is a prohibition, a concentration 
must be prohibited”,50 because Article 53(1)(b) of  the PCL does not allow that discretion.
In addition, and as a direct consequence of  the principle of  proportionality, it 
must be concluded that the NCA must accept the commitments submitted and issue 
a decision of  non-opposition where they, together with conditions or obligations, are 
barriers to competition.51 That view is in line with the position of  the General Court 
expressed in the Ryanair case (Case T-342/07).52 This question is different, as Pedro 
Costa Gonçalves points out, from the “assessment of  the Authority on the adequacy of  the 
proposed commitments to eliminate competition problems”.53
Thus, in the case of  bounded segments, we consider that there is a general 
discretion regarding (i) the substantive decision-making criterion, which consists in 
creating significant impediments to effective competition in the national market or in a 
substantial part thereof  [see Article 43(3) and (4) of  the PCL] and (ii) the adequacy of  
the proposed commitments to eliminate barriers to competition.
In fact, in relation to these points and with the exception of  the crossing segments 
mentioned above, there is no reason to conclude that the legislator did not intend to 
recognize the NCA’s discretion, being certain that they involve technical and prognosis 
judgments and it is mainly in these points that the instrument of  economic regulation must 
be recognized in the merger control procedure.54 Finally, it should be noted that in the 
application of  the aforementioned substantive decision-making criterion, the NCA is 
not bound to the factors provided for in Article 41(2) of  the PCL, since the list, as it 
appears from the legal expression used, is exemplary.
V. Type of  judicial control
In relation to the binding segments, judicial control, in terms of  intensity, can be 
classified as normal and full or merit.
What characterises this type of  control at the level of  the object of  cognition 
is based on the fundamental idea that the Court’s assessment will directly focus on 
the claim of  the author and the confrontation of  the claim with the applicable legal 
parameters, as in civil or criminal proceedings, where there is no first decision by a body 
other than the judiciary. That means that there is no link to the judgment expressed in 
the contested decision by the administrative agent.
49 Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer and Katryn Wright, Judicial scrutiny of  merger…, 106. 
50 Pedro Costa Gonçalves, Controlo de Concentrações…, 293-294. 
51 See Pedro Costa Gonçalves, Controlo de Concentrações…, 295-296.  
52 Paragraph 28: “Where commitments have been validly proposed by the parties to the concentration during the 
administrative procedure in order to obtain a decision that the concentration is compatible with the common market, the 
Commission is required to examine the concentration as modified by those commitments. It is then for the Commission 
to demonstrate that those commitments do not render the concentration, as modified by the commitments, compatible with 
the common market (see, to that effect, in relation to the previous merger regulation, Case T 87/05 EDP v Commission 
[2005] ECR II 3745, paragraphs 63 to 65)”. 
53 Pedro Costa Gonçalves, Controlo de Concentrações…, 296. 
54 Pedro Costa Gonçalves, Controlo de Concentrações…, 250-251. 
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Consequently, the Court has full autonomy in the three relevant decision-
making dimensions, namely: (i) the densification of  normative concepts; (ii) in the 
determination of  the relevant facts and in the assessment of  evidence (considering 
the limits arising from the procedural principles related to the admissibility and/or 
assessment of  evidence); (iii) and subsumption of  the facts to the law. That is to say, 
the Court replaces the assessment made by the NCA by its own, or, when the analysis 
segment is not part of  the subject-matter of  the administrative decision (as for example 
in the case of  incompetence) undertakes an unrestricted assessment.
This may lead to (i) a lack of  competence, if  the rules of  jurisdiction laid down 
by law are infringed; (ii) a misuse of  powers if  the decision was not intended to defend 
and promote competition, but pursuit of  distinct interests that objectively do not meet 
that end, whether private or public, or, in general; (iii) a violation of  the law, whenever, 
due to an error of  fact or an error of  law, the decision of  the NCA violates the legal 
parameters related to the other linked segments referred to.
At the decision-making level, the reform of  administrative litigation that came into 
force on January 1, 2004 and in fulfillment of  the right to effective judicial protection 
provided for in Article 268 (4) of  the Constitution, according to the constitutional 
review of  1997, granted to the administrative courts unlimited jurisdiction, allowing, 
among other things, that the decision of  the Court goes beyond the annulment or 
declaration of  nullity of  administrative acts and can order the Administration to 
practice the act due. The two applications may be cumulated in accordance with Article 
4(2) (a) and (c) of  the CPAC. This is not the case, for example, in European law, whose 
judicial control remains limited at the decision-making stage, since the Courts of  the 
European Union, and specifically with regard to the decisions of  the Commission, can 
only determine its annulment.
There is no reason to reject the possibility of  cumulating requests in the actions 
under analysis, because of  the reference made by Articles 91 and 92, paragraph 1, of  
the PCL, and because of  the recent changes introduced to the CPAC, by Decree-Law 
Nº. 214-G/2015, of  02nd Oct., there is only one form of  proceeding, applicable to all 
non-urgent declaratory processes of  administrative litigation.
Therefore, in cases where there is accumulation of  claims and there is linked 
segments, the Court may not only annul or declare the decision of  the NCA invalid 
but, can also order the Administration to practice the act due [see Article 71 (1) of  
the CPAC].
It should also be noted that, in respect of  that decision-making level, recognition 
of  a defect which may lead to the annulment of  an act does not necessarily lead to 
a declaration of  invalidity or annulment. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind, 
in the first case, the provisions of  Article 162 (3) of  the CPA, which excludes from 
the nullity regime the attribution of  legal effects to situations of  fact resulting from 
null acts, in accordance with the principles of  good faith, the protection of  trust and 
proportionality, or other constitutional legal principles, particularly associated with 
the passage of  time. With regard to nullifying acts, Article 163, paragraph 5, of  the 
CPA, stipulates that the annulment effect does not take place when; the content of  the 
annullable act cannot be different, since the act is of  linked content or the assessment 
of  the particular case allows only one solution to be identified as legally possible; the 
purpose for which the procedural or deferred formal requirement has been reached 
has been achieved by another means; there is no doubt that, even without the defect, 
the act would have been practiced with the same content.
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This is also the guideline of  the European Union Courts. The Court in the 
Schneider case (T-310/01) stated the following assertions: “None the less, however incomplete 
a Commission decision finding a concentration incompatible with the common market may be, that 
cannot entail annulment of  the decision if, and to the extent to which, all the other elements of  the 
decision permit the Court to conclude that in any event implementation of  the transaction will create or 
strengthen a dominant position as a result of  which effective competition will be significantly impeded 
for the purposes of  Article 2(3) of  Regulation No 4064/89” (paragraph 412).55
Let us now look at the type of  judicial control over the discretionary segments. 
At the level of  the object of  cognition, a distinction must be made between two 
distinct planes (i) a more peripheral plan, which focuses on the compatibility of  these 
decision-making judgments with the substrate of  juridicity, that underlies decision, i.e. 
with the limits of  legality; (ii) a more nuclear one, which focuses on the judgment 
of  merit, that is, on technical judgments and/or prognosis on the so-called complex 
economic assessments.
At the peripheral level, the Court may first verify whether the NCA has 
complied with the duty to state reasons, guaranteed by the Constitution itself, when 
the act affects legally protected rights or interests, as is the case [see Article 268(3) of  
the Constitution] and provided for in Articles 151(2) and 152(1) (a) of  the CPA, ex vi 
Article 42, of  the PCL. It is an appreciation from the point of  view of  its intelligibility, 
namely whether it is contextual (if  it refers to that merger), whether it is clear (if  it has 
no obscurity) and whether it is congruent (if  it has no contradictions).56
Second, the Court can assess the compatibility of  the NCA’s decision with the 
basic legal principles governing the exercise of  administrative activity, some of  which 
have constitutional guarantees, such as the principles of  equality, proportionality, 
fairness and impartiality, good faith [see Article 266 (2) of  the Constitution] and others 
that are provided for in the CPA [see Articles 3 to 19 of  the CPA]. In general terms, and 
following the proposal of  Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, it is possible to group these 
principles, with the exception of  the principle of  good faith expressed in the misuse of  
power, in three types of  defects: (i) weighs up all the public interests present in the case (‘concrete 
public interests’); (ii) “the decision differs from other decisions adopted in similar cases”; (iii) and “the 
decision is not adequate, necessary or proportional to the purpose envisaged by the legislator”.57
The first type concerns breach of  the principles of  impartiality (in an objective 
dimension), rationality and reasonableness. Thus, from the principle of  impartiality, it 
is incumbent upon the NCA to comply with the specific circumstances of  the case in 
its decision. According to the other principles, it is the duty, in order for its decision to 
be rationally sustained and reasonable, to collect all the necessary elements to support 
it, to assess its credibility, to consider the various competing interests and the different 
possible perspectives.
The above assertions are in line with the parameters deriving from the case-law 
of  the European Union on mergers, which are embodied in the formula introduced 
by the CJEU in the Tetra Laval case, in the sense that the Court can verify the material 
accuracy of  the evidence that support the decision, its reliability and consistency, as well as its 
sufficiency, that is to say; whether these elements constitute all the relevant data which must be taken 
into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether they are capable of  substantiating the 
55 See also decision in Chemical, paragraph 61.  
56 See Judgment of  the Central Administrative Court of  the North of  11th Jan. 2013, 01772/07.7BEPR, 
STA ruling of  May 27, 2009, case 0308/08; and Miguel Sousa Ferro, A Definição…, 593.  
57 Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade administrativa, 621-625.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2018
129 Marta Campos
conclusions which they are removed.58
The second type of  defect referred to relates to breaches of  the principles of  
Equality, legal certainty, and protection of  confidence. According to these principles, 
the NCA cannot differ from other decisions adopted in similar cases. This is expressed 
in ordinary law in Article 152(1)(d) of  the CPA, which includes the grounds of  the 
decision.59 The practice of  the NCA reveals the application of  this command mainly 
in defining the relevant markets. It is clear that the principle of  equality does not apply 
where previous decisions have been vitiated. In addition, and in view of  the principle 
of  impartiality, the NCA always has to analyze the particular features of  the case, so 
that equality will go as far as the specific features of  the merger agree to. In addition, 
respect for previous decisions is not absolute, as is clear from the aforementioned 
precept. However, the change of  orientation has to be objectively justified.
The guidance adopted by the case law of  the European Union Courts on this 
subject and in the specific context of  the merger operations appears to be diverse. 
In the General Electric case (Case T-210/01), the CFI expressly stated, in light of  the 
principle of  the protection of  legitimate expectations being supported by earlier case-
law,60 that “economic operators have no grounds for a legitimate expectation that a 
previous practice in taking decisions that is capable of  being varied will be maintained” 
(paragraph 119), so that “[a] fortiori, they cannot plead such an expectation to challenge findings or 
assessments made in a given set of  proceedings by invoking findings or assessments made in the context 
of  just one previous case” (para. 119).
However, in the case of  Sun Chemical Group (Case T-282/06), the CFI, although 
referring to these segments of  the General Electric case, is not peremptory in its statement 
of  principle, in the absence of  any decisions taken in similar cases, since the reason 
which led it to dispel the parties’ argument in this respect was that the credibility of  
alternative suppliers had to be assessed in accordance with the circumstances of  each 
individual case and that, consequently, the assessment of  the facts by the Commission 
in previous cases could not be transposed to the present case (para. 88). This is in line 
with the above assertions regarding the scope of  the above principles.61
With regard to the Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of  Horizontal Concentrations and 
the Guidance on the Adoption of  Merger Commitments approved by the NCA, they can also 
generate a self-linking effect as a corollary of  legal certainty and protection of  trust, if  
that they are adjusted to the specificities of  the concrete case and compatible with the 
applicable legal parameters.
With regard to the third type of  defect, it includes breach of  the principle of  
proportionality, in its well-known three dimensions, namely suitability, necessity and 
proportionality in the strict sense or just measure.
In concrete terms, and in order not to invade the NCA’s own area of  valuation, 
the application of  that principle requires, in the context of  prognosis judgments, and 
in accordance with the jurisprudence of  the Court of  Justice, in particular Tetra Laval 
58 See paragraph 39. 
59 See, in light of  the most recent decisions, the decision given in concentration N.º 27/2017 Vallis 
Sustainable, paragraph 5, and in the concentration procedure Cent. 21/2017 - Luz Saúde/British 
Hospital, paragraph 14 and 20, in http://www.concorrencia.pt/FILES_TMP/2017_21_final_net.pdf. 
60 Judgments of  the Court of  First Instance in Case T-347/94 Mayr Melnhof  v Commission [1998] ECR 
II 1751, N.º 368, and of  30 September 2003 in Case T 203/01 Michelin v Commission [2003] II 4071, 
N.ºs 254 to 255 and 292 to 293. 
61 See for further developments on this issue, with an analysis of  European jurisprudence, although 
in the context of  the delimitation of  relevant markets, Miguel Sousa Ferro, A Definição…, 593 et seq. 
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(para. 43) and Sony, Case C-413/06 P (para. 47), “to envisage various chains of  cause and 
effect with a view to ascertaining which of  them is the most likely”. Furthermore, it is also clear 
from that principle that commitments can be accepted only if  the decision, without 
them, is to prohibit the concentration. In addition, it is also a corollary of  the principle 
of  proportionality that the NCA, in determining the conditions or obligations aimed 
at ensuring compliance with these commitments, guides its selection by vectors of  
adequacy, necessity and fair measure.62
Finally, and still in the peripheral dimension, the decision of  the NCA cannot 
violate fundamental rights.63 This is not, of  course, a question of  the rights underlying 
the merger itself, in particular, the right to freedom of  concentration, as this was weighed up 
by the legislature in determining the rules governing the control procedure. What is at 
stake is the non-infringement of  other fundamental rights.
At the nuclear level of  complex economic assessments of  an economic nature or in 
prognosis judgments, an important distinction must be made between; “what are primary 
facts on the one hand, and what are assessments, or inferences constructed from the primary facts, on 
the other hand”. It is a difficult distinction. However, it is important that it be asked so 
that discretion is restricted to that nucleus which sustains it, in light of  the material 
foundation above.
We propose a negative criterion. According to this criterion, it is considered a 
fact - in this sense of  primary fact or “pure fact” - any fact that does not result in a 
judgment of  prognosis, projection or probability.
Thus, in relation to such primary facts, the Court can control the so-called 
“error of  fact”, which, following the case law of  the Administrative Courts on this 
matter “constitutes one of  the grounds for invalidity of  the administrative act, of  a breach of  a 
law which constitutes an illegality of  a material nature ‘and which consists in the divergence between 
the assumptions that the author of  the act set out to protract the final administrative decision and its 
actual verification in the specific situation, resulting from the fact that considered in the administrative 
decision facts not proven or disconforming with reality, that is the grounds of  the motivation of  the 
act in question did not exist or had no dimension that was supposed by him”.64 It is clear that this 
defect may not lead to the annulment of  the decision of  the NCA if  one of  the cases 
provided for in Article 163 (5) of  the CPA is found.
It should be noted that this position is in line with the European Union case-
law on the subject. In fact, although there are no general rules distinguishing between 
primary facts and complex economic assessments. The Court, in particular, in the case 
of  Aalborg Portland (Case C-204/00 P), made it clear that the Court can verify the 
material accuracy of  facts (paragraph 279).65
Lastly, as regards economic evaluations per se, that is to say, the hard core of  the 
NCA’s discretion, legal systems in general, however deferential, still admit a certain type 
of  control, less intense. The differences are more terminological than content.
Thus, in the US and in relation to the interpretation of  indeterminate or ambiguous 
concepts, Chevron step-two calls for reasonableness according to the criteria of  
interpretation, that is, even if  the interpretation adopted is not that which the Court 
62 See Pedro Costa Gonçalves, Controlo…, 286-287. 
63 It should be borne in mind that in respect of  certain matters such as freedom of  expression, the 
protection of  potentially affected fundamental rights is ensured through binding decisions by the 
respective entities. 
64 Supreme Administrative Court ruling of  12th March 2009, case n.º 0545/08. 
65 See also the extensive conclusions of  Advocate General Tizzano in the Tetra Laval case: discretion 
inherent in that type of  assessment and cannot replace the body to which those paragraph 85 and 86. 
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would undertake, it must accept it when it is reasonable or permissible in the light of  
those criteria, in which case there is judicial deference. Therefore, if  the interpretation 
is unreasonable, there will no longer be judicial deference. In the case of  “agency’s policy 
judgment”, the so-called “arbitrary and capricious test” applies.66
In the United Kingdom, the concept of  “irrationality”, known as “Wednesbury 
unreasonableness”, is used when no reasonable decision-maker would have reached the 
decision subject to judicial review on the basis of  the facts, evidence and any relevant 
assertions it has.67
In France, the concept of  manifest error of  assessment was adopted,68 which is a 
gross error which no reasonable person would have committed. This is also the concept 
used by European Union case-law and our administrative case-law and doctrine.69
There is no reason why this criterion should not also be applied in the field of  
mergers. It is a specificity, justified by the specialisation of  judicial review in the matter. 
Thus, gross error should not only be based on common sense, but also on the basis of  
parameters which, perhaps having their origin in the economy, have been assimilated 
by competition law if  there is a general consensus on their sense. And in this context 
the jurisprudence of  the European Union Courts can be an important aid tool. Along 
the same lines, it should also include, in the Schneider case, choices of  econometric 
instruments and approaches that are manifestly contrary to accepted rules of  economic 
discipline (para. 132).
Lastly, at the decision-making level, the Court is also not limited, in respect of  those 
segments, to annul the decision of  the Board. It can issue decisions of  condemnation, 
having accumulation of  requests to that direction. However, except in cases designated 
as “zero discretion”,70 that is to say, where “from the particular circumstances of  the case it 
follows that only a solution proves to be legally viable”, that decision of  conviction shall not 
result in the definition of  the content or meaning of  the decision of  the NCA, but in 
the delimitation of  the elements and/or vices that the NCA must investigate and/or 
delete. It will be a “framework sentence”.71
VI. Conclusions
Based on the above assumptions, is possible to synthesize them in the following 
essential vectors:
a) European Competition law is not directly applicable to the judicial control of  
NCA’s decisions in mergers control procedure, because it is, firstly, a domestic 
problem, without prejudice to recourse to European Union case-law as a 
criterion for interpretation;
b) Under domestic law, the solution must be found in Articles 3(1), 71(2) and 
91(5) of  the CPAC, which are applied through Articles 91 and 92(1), both of  
the PCL;
c) The application of  these rules requires a distinction to be made between the 
binding segments and the discretionary segments;
66 Jan S. Oster, The Scope…, 1284-1285. 
67 See Matthew O’Regan and Ruth Jefferson, “Merger litigation in the United Kingdom”, The Antitrust 
Bulletin, vol. 58, n.ºs 2 and 3 (2013): 469. 
68 See Nicolas Petit and Rabeux Louise, Judicial…, 110. 
69 See Vieira de Andrade, Os poderes…, 38.
70 Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, A discricionariedade…, 618. 
71 For further developments about the concept António Cadilha, Os Poderes..., 195 et seq. 
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d) The criterion adopted does not distinguish between volitional discretionary 
and cognitive discretion and seeks to determine the will of  the legislator, by 
means of  interpretation and in the name of  the Principle of  Separation and 
interdependence of  powers, circumscribing the possibility of  recognition 
of  discretion, according to the material foundations that also support it, to 
technical judgments, judgments of  prognosis, judgments of  rationalisation of  
resources or strategic decisions;
e) The application of  this criterion to the NCA’s formal decision does not 
subject the merger to the control procedure. The merits decisions lead to the 
recognition of  discretion only in relation to the following segments: (i) the 
substantive decision-making criterion, consisting of  creating significant barriers 
to effective competition in the national market or a substantial part of  it [see 
Article 43 (3) and (4) of  the PCL] and (ii) adequacy of  proposed commitments 
to remove barriers to competition;
f) In any case, the cross-sections with the sanctioning dimension of  the PCL 
are always bound, and this is one of  the few points of  divergence between 
domestic law and European competition policy in this area;
g) The type of  judicial control in relation to the related parties is a normal, full 
or meritorious control which implies full independence of  the Court: (i) in 
the densification of  the normative concepts; (ii) in the determination of  the 
relevant facts and in the assessment of  evidence; (iii) and in subsumption of  the 
facts to the law;
h) The type of  judicial control in respect of  discretionary segments is limited, 
marginal, or legal control, which takes place on two levels; (i) one more 
peripheral, which focuses on the compatibility of  these decisive judgments with 
the substrate of  juridicity that underlies the decision, that is, with the limits of  
juridicity and (ii) a more nuclear one, which focuses on the merits judgment, 
that is, on the technical and/or prognosis judgments or on the said complex 
economic assessments and that allow the control of  the error of  fact and the 
manifest error of  assessment.
